Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):523 - 544 (1997)
The author first argues against the view that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if it is morally wrong for that agent to perform that action. The author then proposes a replacement for this view whose gist is summarized in the principle: an agent S is morally blameworthy for performing action A only if S has the belief that it is wrong for her to do A and this belief plays an appropriate role in S's Aing. He focuses on explicating the role an agent's belief that a prospective action, A, of hers is wrong must play in the production of her A-ing in order that she be blameworthy for A-ing. Towards this end, the author makes use of cases involving akrasia and selfdeception
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
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