Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-style enabling cases

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414 (2011)
Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom-relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt-style examples are not cogent. In this paper, we explain why his argument fails
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01403.x
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Neil Levy (2014). Frankfurt in Fake Barn Country. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):529-542.

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Eric Funkhouser (2009). Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.
Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2007). Finking Frankfurt. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74.

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