Incompatibilism and prudential obligation

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410 (2010)
Abstract
Take determinism to be the thesis that for any instant, there is exactly one physically possible future (van Inwagen 1983, 3), and understand incompatibilism regarding responsibility to be the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. Of the many different arguments that have been advanced for this view, the crux of a relatively traditional one is this: If determinism is true, then we lack alternatives.1 If we lack alternatives, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. Therefore, if determinism is true, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. The second premise is a version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP): persons are morally ..
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI cjphil201040327
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