Journal of Ethics 4 (3):211-235 (2000)
I first adumbrate pertinent aspectsof Robert Kane''s libertarian theory of free choice oraction and an objection of luck that has been levelledagainst the theory. I then consider Kane''s recentresponses to this objection. To meet these responses,I argue that the view that undetermined choices (ofthe sort implied by Kane''s theory) are a matter ofluck is associated with a view about actionexplanation, to wit: when Jones does A and hisdoing of A is undetermined, and when hiscounterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possibleworld in which the past and the laws are held constantuntil the moment of choice does B instead, thereis no explanation (deterministic or indeterministic)of the difference in outcome – Jones''s A-ing butJones*''s B-ing – in terms of prior reasonsor motives of either agent. Absence of such anexplanation is one crucial factor that underliesthe charge that Jones''s A-ing and Jones*''sB-ing are matters of luck. I argue that thissort of luck is incompatible with responsibility.
|Keywords||Compatibilism Ethics Free Will Indeterminism Luck Responsibility|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
On the Ultimate Responsibility of Collectives.Ish Haji - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):292–308.
Similar books and articles
Kanian Freedom and the Problem of Luck.John Lemos - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):515-532.
On Free Will, Responsibility and Indeterminism: Responses to Clarke, Haji, and Mele.Robert H. Kane - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):105-121.
Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Type Examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
Modest Libertarianism, Luck, and Control.Ishtiyaque H. Haji - 2007 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):77-89.
Luck and History-Sensitive Compatibilism.Neil Levy - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251.
Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Determinism.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-40.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads76 ( #64,898 of 2,087,687 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #294,699 of 2,087,687 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.