Indeterminism, explanation, and luck

The Journal of Ethics 4 (3):211-235 (2000)
I first adumbrate pertinent aspectsof Robert Kane''s libertarian theory of free choice oraction and an objection of luck that has been levelledagainst the theory. I then consider Kane''s recentresponses to this objection. To meet these responses,I argue that the view that undetermined choices (ofthe sort implied by Kane''s theory) are a matter ofluck is associated with a view about actionexplanation, to wit: when Jones does A and hisdoing of A is undetermined, and when hiscounterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possibleworld in which the past and the laws are held constantuntil the moment of choice does B instead, thereis no explanation (deterministic or indeterministic)of the difference in outcome – Jones''s A-ing butJones*''s B-ing – in terms of prior reasonsor motives of either agent. Absence of such anexplanation is one crucial factor that underliesthe charge that Jones''s A-ing and Jones*''sB-ing are matters of luck. I argue that thissort of luck is incompatible with responsibility.
Keywords Compatibilism  Ethics  Free Will  Indeterminism  Luck  Responsibility
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1009817905421
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What Luck is Not.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):255 – 267.
Why Free Will Remains a Mystery.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.
The Demand for Contrastive Explanations.Nadine Elzein - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.
On the Ultimate Responsibility of Collectives.Ish Haji - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):292–308.

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