Kant on Moral Illusion and Appraisal of Others

Kantian Review 22 (3):421-440 (2017)

Authors
David Hakim
University of Western Ontario
Abstract
Kant’s accounts of moral education, appraisal respect and gratitude each depend on the assumption that human beings see and judge each other’s actions to be morally good. This assumption appears to stand in tension with the Opacity Thesis, Kant’s claim that we can never know if an action is morally good. This paper examines Kant’s discussion of moral illusion to relieve this tension. It is argued that we are required to uphold moral illusion, i.e. to represent others’ actions to be morally good (while knowing that we may be mistaken), due to the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being.
Keywords Kant  Duty of Beneficence  Opacity  Appraisal  Moral Illusion
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DOI 10.1017/s1369415417000152
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References found in this work BETA

The Practice of Moral Judgment.Barbara Herman - 1993 - Ethics 106 (2):404-423.
The Duty of Self-Knowledge.Owen Ware - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):671-698.
The Moral Significance of Gratitude in Kant's Ethics.Houston Smit & Mark Timmons - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):295-320.
Much Obliged: Kantian Gratitude Reconsidered.Kate Moran - 2016 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98 (3):330-363.

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