Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266 (2007)
Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects.
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References found in this work BETA
The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View.Raimo Tuomela - 2007 - Oup Usa.
The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions.Raimo Tuomela - 1995 - Stanford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Which Groups Have Scientific Knowledge? Wray Vs. Rolin.Chris Dragos - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (5-6):611-623.
Groups as Epistemic Communities: Social Forces and Affect as Antecedents to Knowledge.Miika Vähämaa - 2013 - Social Epistemology 27 (1):3 - 20.
Membership and Knowledge. Scientific Research as a Group Activity.Silvia Tossut - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):349-367.
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