Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266 (2007)

Authors
Raul Hakli
University of Helsinki
Abstract
Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects.
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DOI 10.1080/02691720701685581
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Citations of this work BETA

Group Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (1):21-42.
Group Action Without Group Minds.Kenneth Silver - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):321-342.
Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat.J. Adam Carter - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
Group Understanding.Kenneth Boyd - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6837-6858.
Group Belief: Lessons From Lies and Bullshit.I.—Jennifer Lackey - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):185-208.

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