On the possibility of group knowledge without belief

Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266 (2007)
Abstract
Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects.
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DOI 10.1080/02691720701685581
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References found in this work BETA
Reasoning About Knowledge.Ronald Fagin (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.

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Citations of this work BETA
Group Justification in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
Group Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
Which Groups Have Scientific Knowledge? Wray Vs. Rolin.Chris Dragos - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (5-6):611-623.

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Modelling Collective Belief.Margaret Gilbert - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):185-204.
The Epistemology of Belief.Hamid Vahid - 2009 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
Collective Belief and Acceptance.K. Brad Wray - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):319-33.

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