The Fundamentality and Non-Fundamentality of Ontological Categories

In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Jonathan Lowe and Ontology. Routledge (forthcoming)

Authors
Jani Hakkarainen
Tampere University
Abstract
In this paper, I propose a solution to an almost ignored problem in metaphysics and metametaphysics: what is categorial fundamentality and non-fundamentality? My proposal builds on E. J. Lowe’s view on the issue. By means of the newcomer notion of generic identity, I can give an account of something that Lowe did not explicate: the constitution of formal ontolog- ical relations. Formal ontological relations (e.g. instantiation) are internal relations that deter- mine ontological form and category-membership. I argue that categorial fundamentality is hav- ing membership fully determined by a simple formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an order and categorial non-fundamentality is having membership at least partly determined by a derived formal ontological relation in an order. In contrast to Lowe, my proposal does not pre- suppose non-modal essentialism. (Please, ask for the penultimate draft.)
Keywords ontological categories, ontological form  ontological form  mode of being  fundamentality  substance  property  universals  particulars  tropes  modes  monism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,694
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-02-03

Total views
1 ( #1,516,358 of 2,462,479 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,311 of 2,462,479 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes