Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):427-431 (1992)
Standard objections to dualism focus on problems of individuation: what, in the absence of matter, serves to diversify immaterial items? and interaction: how can material and immaterial elements causally affect one another? Given certain ways of conceiving mental phenomena and causation, it is not obvious that one cannot reply to these objections. However, a different kind of difficulty comes into view when one considers the question of the origin of the mental. Here attention is directed upon the case of intentionality. It might seem that the transition between non-intentional and intentional phenomena could be dealt with by adopting a version of Dennett's discharging strategy, but this is argued against. Several responses to the origination problem are identified, including a creationist one
|Keywords||Causality Dualism Intentionality Mental Metaphysics|
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References found in this work BETA
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Psychoanalysis, Cognitive Psychology and Self-Consciousness.John J. Haldane - 1988 - In P. Clark & C. Wright (eds.), Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science. Blackwell.
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