An embarrassing question about reproduction

Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):427-431 (1992)
Standard objections to dualism focus on problems of individuation: what, in the absence of matter, serves to diversify immaterial items? and interaction: how can material and immaterial elements causally affect one another? Given certain ways of conceiving mental phenomena and causation, it is not obvious that one cannot reply to these objections. However, a different kind of difficulty comes into view when one considers the question of the origin of the mental. Here attention is directed upon the case of intentionality. It might seem that the transition between non-intentional and intentional phenomena could be dealt with by adopting a version of Dennett's discharging strategy, but this is argued against. Several responses to the origination problem are identified, including a creationist one
Keywords Causality  Dualism  Intentionality  Mental  Metaphysics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089208573072
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,220
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality.John J. Haldane - 1989 - Inquiry 32 (September):305-22.
Review: Analysis Freud. [REVIEW]Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):241 - 254.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Metaphysics of Mind.Thomas W. Polger - 2012 - In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics.
Intentionality and Causality in John Searle.David L. Thompson - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (March):83-97.
Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2009 - In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 474--493.
Self-Agency and Mental Causality.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional?Anders Nes - 2008 - Analysis 68 (299):205–215.
Mental Causation and Searle's Impossible Conception of Unconscious Intentionality.Anthonie W. M. Meijers - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):155-170.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

18 ( #269,342 of 2,164,867 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #348,012 of 2,164,867 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums