Briggs on antirealist accounts of scientific law

Synthese 190 (16):3439–3449 (2013)
Authors
John F. Halpin
Oakland University
Abstract
Rachel Briggs’ critique of “antirealist” accounts of scientific law— including my own perspectivalist best-system account—is part of a project meant to show that Humean conceptions of scientific law are more problematic than has been commonly realized. Indeed, her argument provides a new challenge to the Humean, a thoroughly epistemic version of David Lewis’ “big, bad bug” for Humeanism. Still, I will argue, the antirealist (perspectivalist and expressivist) accounts she criticizes have the resources to withstand the challenge and come out stronger for it. Attention to epistemic possibilities, I argue, shows a number of advantages to a perspectivalist account of scientific law.
Keywords Humeanism  Humean supervenience  Chance  Laws  Best-system account  David Lewis  Big bad bug
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0202-z
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers Vol. II.Lewis David - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
The Nature of Laws.Michael Tooley - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):667-98.
Laws of Nature.John W. Carroll - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Correcting the Guide to Objective Chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.

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