Briggs on antirealist accounts of scientific law

Synthese 190 (16):3439–3449 (2013)
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Abstract

Rachel Briggs’ critique of “antirealist” accounts of scientific law— including my own perspectivalist best-system account—is part of a project meant to show that Humean conceptions of scientific law are more problematic than has been commonly realized. Indeed, her argument provides a new challenge to the Humean, a thoroughly epistemic version of David Lewis’ “big, bad bug” for Humeanism. Still, I will argue, the antirealist (perspectivalist and expressivist) accounts she criticizes have the resources to withstand the challenge and come out stronger for it. Attention to epistemic possibilities, I argue, shows a number of advantages to a perspectivalist account of scientific law.

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John F. Halpin
Oakland University

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References found in this work

Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis (ed.) - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
The nature of laws.Michael Tooley - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):667-98.
Correcting the guide to objective chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.

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