Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part II: Explanations

Abstract
We propose new definitions of (causal) explanation, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. The definition is based on the notion of actual cause, as defined and motivated in a companion article. Essentially, an explanation is a fact that is not known for certain but, if found to be true, would constitute an actual cause of the fact to be explained, regardless of the agent's initial uncertainty. We show that the definition handles well a number of problematic examples from the literature
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axi148
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Grounding in the Image of Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.
Structural Equations and Causation.N. Hall - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):109 - 136.
Of Miracles and Interventions.Luke Glynn - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):43-64.
The Problem of Variable Choice.James Woodward - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1047-1072.

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