Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):525 – 535 (2008)

Abstract
Many bodily sensations are connected quite closely with specific actions: itches with scratching, for example, and hunger with eating. Indeed, these connections have the feel of conceptual connections. With the exception of D. M. Armstrong, philosophers have largely neglected this aspect of bodily sensations. In this paper, I propose a theory of bodily sensations that explains these connections. The theory ascribes intentional content to bodily sensations but not, strictly speaking, representational content. Rather, the content of these sensations is an imperative: in the case of itches, 'Scratch!' The view avoids non-intentional qualia and hence accords with what could be called, generalizing Lycan slightly, the 'hegemony of intentionality'.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802346813
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.
An Imperative Theory of Pain.Colin Klein - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (10):517-532.

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Citations of this work BETA

Fish and Microchips: On Fish Pain and Multiple Realization.Matthias Michel - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2411-2428.
What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Pains That Don't Hurt.David Bain - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):305-320.
Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.

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