Legal Formalism, Stage-Neutrality, and Comparative Justice

Abstract
Several writers have argued recently that optimal rules of law authorize morally suboptimal decisions in certain cases.1 Larry Alexander calls these “gap cases.”2 Should judges in gap cases defer to legal rules or deviate from them? Philosophers known as “formalists” favor deference, “particularists” favor deviation.
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