Philosophical Papers 31 (1):1-25 (2002)

Authors
Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London
Abstract
Abstract The paper explicates a set of criteria the joint satisfaction of which is taken to qualify moral judgements as cognitive. The paper examines evidence that some moral judgements meet these criteria, and relates the resulting conception of moral judgements to ongoing controversies about cognitivism in ethics
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DOI 10.1080/05568640209485092
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References found in this work BETA

Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Moral Belief Problem.Neil Sinclair - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):249–260.
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Aesthetic Testimony and the Test of Time.Jon Robson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):729-748.
Propositional Clothing and Belief.Neil Sinclair - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342-362.

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