Synthese (forthcoming)

Geoffrey Hall
University of Notre Dame
This paper defends the view that phenomenal properties are (consistent) luminous properties. On this view, if there is something that it is like to have some property, in the relevant sense, then it is a property one must always know oneself to have when one has it.
Keywords Phenomenal properties  Reductive theories of consciousness  Higher order theories of consciousness  Phenomenal intentionality  Luminosity  Epistemology of perception
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

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