Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):786-798 (2009)
Disquotational theories of truth, that is, theories of truth based on the T-sentences or similar equivalences as axioms are often thought to be deductively weak. This view is correct if the truth predicate is allowed to apply only to sentences not containing the truth predicate. By taking a slightly more liberal approach toward the paradoxes, I obtain a disquotational theory of truth that is proof theoretically as strong as compositional theories such as the Kripket probe the compositional axioms
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References found in this work BETA
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse.Hartry Field - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):405-452.
Citations of this work BETA
Autonomous Progression and Transfinite Iteration of Self-Applicable Truth.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2011 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 76 (3):914 - 945.
T-Equivalences for Positive Sentences.Cezary Cieśliński - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (2):319-325.
A Disquotational Theory of Truth as Strong as Z 2 −.Thomas Schindler - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (4):395-410.
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