Synthese 69 (3):325 - 340 (1986)

John F. Halpin
Oakland University
In his (1981) paper, Stalnaker has revised his old theory of conditionals and has given the revision an interesting defense. Indeed, Stalnaker shows that this new theory meets the standard objections put to the old. However, I argue that the revision runs into difficulties in the context of quantum mechanics: If Stalnaker's theory of the conditional is assumed, then from plausible assumptions certain Bell-like conflicts with experiment can be derived. This result, I go on to argue, is a good reason to reject Stalnaker's theory, at least for the quantum mechanical context.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413977
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1974 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Studies in Logical Theory.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - Oxford: Blackwell.

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