Philosophical Studies 132 (1):109 - 136 (2007)

Authors
Ned Hall
Harvard University
Abstract
Structural equations have become increasingly popular in recent years as tools for understanding causation. But standard structural equations approaches to causation face deep problems. The most philosophically interesting of these consists in their failure to incorporate a distinction between default states of an object or system, and deviations therefrom. Exploring this problem, and how to fix it, helps to illuminate the central role this distinction plays in our causal thinking.
Keywords Causation  Counterfactuals  Causal models  Structural equations  Defaults  Deviants
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-006-9057-9
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Grounding in the Image of Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.
Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Contrastive Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
Graded Causation and Defaults.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):413-457.

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