Structural equations and causation

Philosophical Studies 132 (1):109 - 136 (2007)
Abstract
Structural equations have become increasingly popular in recent years as tools for understanding causation. But standard structural equations approaches to causation face deep problems. The most philosophically interesting of these consists in their failure to incorporate a distinction between default states of an object or system, and deviations therefrom. Exploring this problem, and how to fix it, helps to illuminate the central role this distinction plays in our causal thinking.
Keywords Causation  Counterfactuals  Causal models  Structural equations  Defaults  Deviants
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-006-9057-9
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References found in this work BETA
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.Lewis David - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

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Citations of this work BETA
Grounding in the Image of Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.
Response to Strevens.Jim Woodward - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):193-212.
Interventionist Counterfactuals.Rachael Briggs - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
Graded Causation and Defaults.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):413-457.

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