The faculty of intuition

Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The present paper offers an analogical support for the use of rational intuition, namely, if we regard sense perception as a mental faculty that (in general) delivers justified beliefs, then we should treat intuition in the same manner. I will argue that both the cognitive marks of intuition and the role it traditionally plays in epistemology are strongly analogous to that of perception, and barring specific arguments to the contrary, we should treat rational intuition as a source of prima facie justified beliefs. There are two main arguments against the intuition-perception analogy that I will consider and find lacking. First is that while we do use perceptions as evidence to believe certain propositions, in fact no one ever does use intuition evidentially. The second argument, stemming from experimental philosophy, grants that philosophers do use intuitions evidentially, but this practice is fatally unlike that of perception, in that perception yields warranted beliefs and intuition does not.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 105,810

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-08-10

Downloads
379 (#81,879)

6 months
17 (#181,002)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Steven Hales
Bloomsburg University

References found in this work

The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Portland, OR: Home University Library.
Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Mind 21 (84):556-564.

View all 48 references / Add more references