The Problem of Intuition

American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2):135-147 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Traditional philosophy relies heavily on the use of rational intuition to establish theses and conclusions. This essay takes up the matter of intuition and argues for a stunning conclusion: appeal to rational intuition is epistemically justified only if a form of foundationalism is true. This type of foundationalism is the thesis that there is at least one proposition whose justification depends on nothing other than itself. The article also argues that unless we can establish that some intuitions are justified, philosophy as an enterprise that provides non-empirical knowledge is impossible. Not to put too fine a point on it then: philosophy is possible only if foundationalism is true. Whether this should be construed as the strongest possible defense of foundationalism, or the greatest objection to the pretensions of philosophy is left to the reader.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,330

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Is There a Value Problem?Jason Baehr - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 42--59.
The faculty of intuition.Steven D. Hales - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
Rational intuition: Bealer on its nature and epistemic status.Ernest Sosa - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.
Legal validity and the infinite regress.Oliver Black - 1996 - Law and Philosophy 15 (4):339 - 368.


Added to PP

221 (#80,479)

6 months
5 (#237,114)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Steven Hales
Bloomsburg University

Citations of this work

The faculty of intuition.Steven D. Hales - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
Surveying Philosophers About Philosophical Intuition.J. R. Kuntz & J. R. C. Kuntz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):643-665.
Don't Believe the Hype: Why Should Philosophical Theories Yield to Intuitions?Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):141-158.
Interpreting Intuitions.Marcus McGahhey & Neil Van Leeuwen - 2018 - In Julie Kirsch Patrizia Pedrini (ed.), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Springer Verlag. pp. 73-98.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references