Advice for Analytic Naturalists

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I argue against Analytic Normative Naturalism by suggesting that the view cannot capture the way that normative concepts figure in advice. To establish this conclusion, I identify several links between normative concepts and advice and argue that, if Analytic Normative Naturalism were true, these links would not obtain.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

The Normative Property Dualism Argument.Jesse Hambly - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms.Pekka Väyrynen - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 28 (3):505-530.
Naturalism and normative cognition.Matthew S. Bedke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):147-167.
The Stuff That Matters.N. G. Laskowski - 2024 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies of Metaethics 19. Oxford University Press USA.
Against Normative Naturalism.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-07-06

Downloads
330 (#71,851)

6 months
160 (#31,112)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jesse Hambly
Australian National University (PhD)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
Moral Luck.Bernard Williams - 1981 - Critica 17 (51):101-105.
What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.

View all 31 references / Add more references