Synthese 193 (9) (2016)
Authors | |
Abstract |
This paper argues that the intentional actions of collective entities, such as corporations and agencies, are not necessarily joint intentional actions by several members of those collectives. I briefly summarize the social action theories of John Searle, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, and Seumas Miller, which I argue are all theories of joint action. I then describe a case based loosely on events from the 2008 financial crisis in which an intentional collective action is performed by a corporation due to the actions of two employees who have no knowledge of one another, and therefore cannot be engaged in a joint intentional action. I argue that this shows that, contrary to what joint action theorists are committed to, every intentional collective action does not entail the existence of a joint intentional action. Finally, I suggest that we should look for a weaker notion of coordination than that employed by joint action theories, and that this might be provided by examining the command structures of organizations
|
Keywords | Collective intentionality Social action Social epistemology Corporate personhood |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2016 |
DOI | 10.1007/s11229-015-0876-0 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization.John R. Searle - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.
View all 12 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action.Deborah Tollefsen - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
Joint Epistemic Action and Collective Moral Responsibility.Seumas Miller - 2015 - Social Epistemology 29 (3):280-302.
The Epistemic Core of Weak Joint Action.Cedric Paternotte - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (1):1-24.
Joint Action and Group Action Made Precise.Gabriel Sandu & Raimo Tuomela - 1995 - Synthese 105 (3):319 - 345.
Joint Attention in Joint Action.Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
Assertions, Joint Epistemic Actions and Social Practices.Seumas Miller - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):71-94.
Joint Action and Recursive Consciousness of Consciousness.Sebastian Rödl - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):769-779.
Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action.Axel Seemann - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (5):637-655.
Collective Intentional Activities and the Law.Rodrigo Sanchez Brigido - 2009 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2):305-324.
Naturalizing Joint Action: A Process-Based Approach.Deborah Tollefsen & Rick Dale - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):385-407.
Why We Do Things Together: The Social Motivation for Joint Action.Marion Godman - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):588-603.
Michael E. Bratman: Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together: New York, Oxford University Press USA, 2014, ISBN: 978-0-190-933999-0, 240 Pages, £ 19.99.Andras Szigeti - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1101-1104.
Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
Social Facts Explained and Presupposed.Boris Hennig - 2006 - In Nikos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality. Ontos Verlag.
What Does Doing One's Part of a Joint Action Involve?Raimo Tuomela - 1989 - Analyse & Kritik 11 (2):197-207.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2015-09-11
Total views
77 ( #148,506 of 2,498,760 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #422,193 of 2,498,760 )
2015-09-11
Total views
77 ( #148,506 of 2,498,760 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #422,193 of 2,498,760 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads