Authors
Manhal Hamdo
University of Delhi
Abstract
From Plato to present, intuition plays a central role in epistemology. My concern in this paper is with the nature and epistemic status on intuition. To that end, I will be reviewing both Bealer’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts of intuition. I will be arguing that by ‘intuition’ Bealer understands modal intuition that has Platonic and metaphysical roles. Subsequently, I shall also show that although Wittgenstein’s view avoids these two issues, it amounts to the idea that intuition is a normative activity with a dialectical value. As a result, if Bealer and Wittgenstein are right, then intuition should no more have any epistemic and evidential role.
Keywords Intuition  Platonism  Modal and Metaphysical Truths  Normative a priori, Epistemic or Evidential Role.
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References found in this work BETA

A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
The Incoherence of Empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.
The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism.George Bealer - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:1-34.

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