Freedom and Fatefulness

Theory, Culture and Society 17 (2):83-104 (2000)

Abstract
This article reassesses Arendt's relationship to Augustine, exploring the Augustinian context for Arendt's own thinking about the relationship between thought and action. What Arendt drew from Augustine, the contours of which remain in her later work, is a journey of memory in which reflection, as it removes us from the world, paradoxically reveals us as inserted into this world. Out of this ontology of origins emerges an ethic of beginning as we recognize, in the moment of reflection, a bond of kinship and an equality toward each other that is constituted by our common relationship of beginning and fatefulness to the world. It is this Augustinian journey of memory that continued to guide Arendt's thinking in developing a political ethic that shared with action the ontological foundation of beginning
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DOI 10.1177/02632760022051121
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References found in this work BETA

After Virtue.A. MacIntyre - 1981 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.
On Revolution.E. J. Hobsbawm & Hanna Arendt - 1965 - History and Theory 4 (2):252.
Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy,.Hannah Arendt & Ronald Beiner - 1982 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 56 (2):386-386.
The Life of the Mind.[author unknown] - 1980 - Human Studies 3 (3):302-308.

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