Memory and self-consciousness: immunity to error through misidentification

Synthese 171 (3):409-417 (2008)

Authors
Andy Hamilton
Durham University
Abstract
In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein defined a category of uses of “I” which he termed “I”-as-subject, contrasting them with “I”-as-object uses. The hallmark of this category is immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). This article extends Wittgenstein’s characterisation to the case of memory-judgments, discusses the significance of IEM for self-consciousness—developing the idea that having a first-person thought involves thinking about oneself in a distinctive way in which one cannot think of anyone or anything else—and refutes a common objection to the claim that memory-judgments exhibit IEM.
Keywords Philosophy   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language   Logic   Epistemology   Computer Science, general   Philosophy of Science
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Reprint years 2009
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9318-6
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
The First Person.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 45–65.
Memory, Amnesia, and the Past.Christoph Hoerl - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):227-51.

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Citations of this work BETA

Memory as Mental Time Travel.Denis Perrin & Kourken Michaelian - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 228-239.
First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.

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