Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):74-74 (1998)

Abstract
Externalism cannot work as a theory of concepts without explaining how we reidentify substances as being of the same kind. Yet this process implies just the level of descriptive content to which externalism seeks to deny a role in conceptual content.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x98320403
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