The analogy of feeling

Mind 61 (January):1-12 (1952)
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In this article the author is concerned with the justification of the knowledge of other minds by virtue of statements of other people's feelings based upon inductive arguments of any ordinary pattern as being inferences from the observed to the unobserved of a familiar and accepted form. The author argues that they are not logically peculiar or invalid, When considered as inductive arguments. The author also proposes that solipsism is a linguistically absurd thesis, While at the same time stopping to explain why it is a thesis which tempts those who confuse epistemological distinctions with logical distinctions. (staff)



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Citations of this work

Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Other minds.Alec Hyslop - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The indexical nature of sensory concepts.John O'Dea - 2002 - Philosophical Papers 32 (2):169-181.
Analogies and Other Minds.Bryan Benham - 2009 - Informal Logic 29 (2):198-214.

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