The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason

Economics and Philosophy 10 (2):195 (1994)
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Abstract

Expected-utility theory has been a popular and influential theory in philosophy, law, and the social sciences. While its original developers, von Neumann and Morgenstern, presented it as a purely predictive theory useful to the practitioners of economic science, many subsequent theorists, particularly those outside of economics, have come to endorse EU theory as providing us with a representation of reason. But precisely in what sense does EU theory portray reason? And does it do so successfully? There are two strikingly different answers to these questions in the literature. On the one hand, there is the view of people such as David Gauthier that EU theory is an implementation of the idea that reason's only role is instrumental. On the other hand, there is the view suggested by Leonard Savage that the theory is a “formal” and noninstrumental characterization of our reasoning process

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Citations of this work

On the Interpretation of Decision Theory.Samir Okasha - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (3):409-433.
Two kinds of we-reasoning.Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller & Raimo Tuomela - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):291-320.
Knowing our degrees of belief.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):269-287.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
A treatise of human nature.David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb (eds.) - 1969 - Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Morals by agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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