The Normative Property Dualism Argument

The Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I develop an argument against a type of Non-Analytic Normative Naturalism. This argument, the Normative Property Dualism Argument, suggests that, if Non-Analytic Normative Naturalists posit that normative properties are identical to natural properties and that such identities are a posteriori, they will be forced to posit that these properties which are both normative and natural have higher-order normative properties of their own.

Similar books and articles

Naturalism and normative cognition.Matthew S. Bedke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):147-167.
Against Normative Naturalism.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.
Advice for Analytic Naturalists.Jesse Hambly - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.
Irreducibly Normative Properties.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10:216–244.
property dualism, epistemic normativity, and the limits of naturalism.Christian Onof - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):60-85.
Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms.Pekka Väyrynen - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 28 (3):505-530.
What Normativity Cannot Be.Matthew Bedke - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (2).
Naturalism in Metaethics.Jussi Suikkanen - 2016 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 351-368.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-03-06

Downloads
192 (#104,276)

6 months
191 (#15,215)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jesse Hambly
Australian National University (PhD)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 59 references / Add more references