Philosophy of Science 35 (1):28-44 (1968)

It is generally agreed that the method of explication consists in replacing a vague, presystematic notion (the explicandum) with a precise notion (the explicatum) formulated in a systematic context. However, Carnap and others who have used this and related terms appear to hold inconsistent views as to what constitutes an adequate explication. The central feature of the present explication of 'explication' is the correspondence condition: permitting the explicandum to deviate from some established "ordinary-language" conventions but, at the same time, requiring that the explicatum correspond (via an effective translation) to the chosen "definitive intension" of the explicandum. (In effect, the first stages of an explication provide an informal characterization of a vague and possibly inconsistent language convention.) The present account of explication contrasts sharply with that sketched by Quine in Word and Object (although Quine accepts a correspondence condition of a sort). The terms `explication 1 ' and `explication 2 ' are used to indicate these quite different senses of the term. In Kaplan's terminology, explication 1 is intended to remedy "external vagueness" while explication 2 is intended to remedy "internal vagueness."
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/288185
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,657
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Carnapian Explications, Experimental Philosophy, and Fruitful Concepts.Steffen Koch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (6):700-717.
The Constituents of an Explication.Moritz Cordes - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):983-1010.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
104 ( #106,807 of 2,462,324 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #223,344 of 2,462,324 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes