Being Realistic about Reflective Equilibrium

Analysis 75 (3):514-522 (2015)
In Being Realistic About Reasons,T.M. Scanlon develops a non-naturalistic realist account of normative reasons. A crucial part of that account is Scanlon’s contention that there is no deep epistemological problem for non-naturalistic realists, and that the method of reflective equilibrium suffices to explain the possibility of normative knowledge. In this critical notice we argue that this is not so: on a realist picture, normative knowledge presupposes a significant correlation between distinct entities, namely between normative beliefs and normative facts. This correlation calls for an explanation. We show that Scanlon does not have the resources to offer such an explanation.
Keywords T.M. Scanlon  reflective equilibrium  reasons  realisms
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anv005
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What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?Sharon Street - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (5):363-384.
Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.

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Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

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