Being Realistic about Reflective Equilibrium

Analysis 75 (3):514-522 (2015)
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In Being Realistic About Reasons,T.M. Scanlon develops a non-naturalistic realist account of normative reasons. A crucial part of that account is Scanlon’s contention that there is no deep epistemological problem for non-naturalistic realists, and that the method of reflective equilibrium suffices to explain the possibility of normative knowledge. In this critical notice we argue that this is not so: on a realist picture, normative knowledge presupposes a significant correlation between distinct entities, namely between normative beliefs and normative facts. This correlation calls for an explanation. We show that Scanlon does not have the resources to offer such an explanation.

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Author Profiles

Hannah Altehenger
Universität Konstanz
Simon Gaus
Humboldt-University, Berlin
Leonhard Menges
University of Salzburg

References found in this work

Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Realism, Mathematics & Modality.Hartry H. Field - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 11 (4):11-12.

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