Doubts about ordinary language in ethics

Many writers assume one of the major functions (if not the major function) of ethical theory is to analyze the “ordinary language”; of moral discourse. This paper argues that different social groups develop quite different concepts of values; that there are many “ordinary languages.”; What analysts often in practice arc concerned with is middle-class ethical usage. In addition, it is argued that widely accepted moral usages may be incorrect because they are based on faulty empirical generalizations, pre-scientific opinions, or socially-determined prejudices. “Ordinary language”; needs to be viewed critically, therefore, rather than to be assumed as correct.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201746008601313
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,370
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Philosophy for Philosophers.Norman Malcolm - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (3):329-340.
Ordinary Language.Gilbert Ryle - 1953 - Philosophical Review 62 (2):167-186.
On the Verification of Statements About Ordinary Language.Benson Mates - 1958 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1 (1-4):161 – 171.
Ordinary Language and Common Sense.A. D. Woozley - 1953 - Mind 62 (247):301-312.
Philosophers and Ordinary Language.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (3):317-328.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
8 ( #502,476 of 2,193,887 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #291,271 of 2,193,887 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature