Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):591-611 (2019)
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Abstract

Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberative democracy. I then propose a version of deliberative democracy that is grounded in non-veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because it facilitates empathetic understanding. I claim that empathetic understanding is an epistemic good that doesn’t have truth as its primary goal.

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Michael Hannon
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Recent Work in the Epistemology of Understanding.Michael Hannon - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):269-290.
What's Wrong with Partisan Deference?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - In Worsnip Alex (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Styles.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):35-55.
Democracy.Tom Christiano - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Enigma of Reason.Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.) - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Against Democracy: New Preface.Jason Brennan - 2016 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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