Files and Singular Thoughts Without Objects or Acquaintance: The Prospects of Recanati’s “Actualism”
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):421-436 (2016)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
We argue that Recanati burdens his otherwise salutary “Mental File” account of singular thought with an “Actualist” assumption that he has inherited from the discussion of singular thought since at least Evans, according to which singular thoughts can only be about actual objects: apparent singular thoughts involving “empty” terms lack truth-valuable content. This assumption flies in the face of manifestly singular thoughts involving not only fictional and mistakenly postulated entities, such as Zeus and the planet Vulcan, but also “perceptual inexistents,” e.g., Kanizsa figures, rainbows, words and phonemes, as well as hosts of at best metaphysically problematic “objects,” such as properties, numbers, ceremonies, contracts, symphonies, “the sky,” “the rain.” Indeed, reflection on what seems to be the boundless diversity of “things” about which we seem to be able to have singular thoughts strongly suggests that there may be no general metaphysics of objects, much less “acquaintance” and “epistemically rewarding” relations that would distinguish singular from non-singular thought. We recommend that Recanati and other mental file theorists confine the theory to a metaphysically neutral account of singular thought as specific kind of internally “focused” computational state, and not seek any general account of the relation of thought to reality.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1007/s13164-015-0246-3 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
View all 37 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
The Mental Files Theory of Singular Thought: A Psychological Perspective.Michael Murez, Joulia Smortchkova & Brent Strickland - 2020 - In Rachel Goodman, James Genone & Nick Kroll (eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 107-142.
Mental Files. Triggering Mechanisms, Metadata and ‘Discernibility of Identicals’.Mieszko Tałasiewicz - 2017 - Studia Semiotyczne 31 (2):13-34.
Similar books and articles
Singular Thoughts (Objects-Directed Thoughts).Jody Azzouni - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):45-61.
Empty Thoughts and Vicarious Thoughts in the Mental File Framework.François Recanati - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):1-11.
An Acquaintance Constraint and a Cognitive Significance Constraint on Singular Thought.Mirela Fuš - 2013 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):163-174.
Singular Thoughts and Singular Propositions.Joshua Armstrong & Jason Stanley - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):205 - 222.
Anti-Descriptivism, Mental Files, And The Communication Of Singular Thoughts.François Recanati - 2009 - Manuscrito 32 (1):7-32.
Cognitivism: A New Theory of Singular Thought?Sarah Sawyer - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):264-283.
Bach's Constraint on Extending Acquaintance: Some Questions and a Modest Proposal.Mirela Fus - 2013 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):201-216.
A New Source of Data About Singular Thought.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1159-1172.
Acquaintance, Singular Thought and Propositional Constituency.Jeffrey C. King - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):543-560.
Singular Thought: Object‐Files, Person‐Files, and the Sortal PERSON.Michael Murez & Joulia Smortchkova - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (4):632-646.
On Recanati’s Mental Files.Dilip Ninan - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):368-377.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2015-06-06
Total views
84 ( #118,608 of 2,409,613 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #347,486 of 2,409,613 )
2015-06-06
Total views
84 ( #118,608 of 2,409,613 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #347,486 of 2,409,613 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads