Acta Analytica:1-16 (forthcoming)

Abstract
The main conclusion is this conditional: If the principle of reflection is a valid constraint on rational credences, then it is not rational to have a uniform credence distribution on a countable outcome space. The argument is a variation on some arguments that are already in the literature, but with crucial differences. The conditional can be used for either a modus ponens or a modus tollens; some reasons for thinking that the former is most reasonable are given.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-021-00499-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,078
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 235-256.
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Fair Countable Lotteries.Casper Storm Hansen - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2787-2794.
Fair Infinite Lotteries.Sylvia Wenmackers & Leon Horsten - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):37-61.
Countable Fréchetα 1-Spaces May Be First Countable.Alan Dow & Juris Stepräns - 1992 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 32 (1):33-50.
Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge.Jonathan Weisberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-197.
Indeterminacy of Fair Infinite Lotteries.Philip Kremer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1757-1760.
Non-Archimedean Preferences Over Countable Lotteries.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2020 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 88 (May 2020):180-186.
Doing the Best One Can: A New Justification for the Use of Lotteries.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2012 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 5 (1):45-72.
Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability.Jon Williamson - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
Deference Done Right.Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2022-01-11

Total views
2 ( #1,442,365 of 2,498,944 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #279,629 of 2,498,944 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes