Fair Countable Lotteries and Reflection

Acta Analytica 37 (4):595-610 (2022)
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The main conclusion is this conditional: If the principle of reflection is a valid constraint on rational credences, then it is not rational to have a uniform credence distribution on a countable outcome space. The argument is a variation on some arguments that are already in the literature, but with crucial differences. The conditional can be used for either a modus ponens or a modus tollens; some reasons for thinking that the former is most reasonable are given.



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Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
Belief and the will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 235-256.

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