Humean dispositionalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):113-126 (2008)
Abstract
Humean metaphysics is characterized by a rejection of necessary connections between distinct existences. Dispositionalists claim that there are basic causal powers. The existence of such properties is widely held to be incompatible with the Humean rejection of necessary connections. In this paper I present a novel theory of causal powers that vindicates the dispositionalist claim that causal powers are basic, without embracing brute necessary connections. The key assumptions of the theory are that there are natural types of causal processes, and that manifestations of powers are identified with certain kinds of causal processes. From these assumptions, the modal features of powers are explained in terms of internal relations between powers themselves and the process-types in which powers are manifested
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DOI 10.1080/00048400701846608
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References found in this work BETA
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.George Molnar - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism.Michael Esfeld - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):179 – 194.
Why Metrical Properties Are Not Powers.Andreas Bartels - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2001-2013.
Putting Powers Back on Multi-Track.Neil E. Williams - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):581-595.

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