Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):251-73 (2016)
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Abstract

The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm says that an event is overall harmful for someone if and only if it makes her worse off than she otherwise would have been. I defend this account from two common objections.

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Nathan Hanna
Drexel University

Citations of this work

Harming as making worse off.Duncan Purves - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2629-2656.
Gene editing, identity and benefit.Thomas Douglas & Katrien Devolder - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):305-325.
A Simple Analysis of Harm.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9:509-536.
Causal Accounts of Harming.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):420-445.
The preemption problem.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):351-365.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Well-being and death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Studies in Logical Theory.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - Oxford: Blackwell.

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