Intention and accident

Philosophical Studies 98 (1):15-34 (2000)
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It is widely held by philosophers of action that an agent does something intentionally only if he does it either as an end or as a means to an end. We are, however, strongly inclined to describe certain doings as intentional despite the apparent failure of this condition to be met. Can we explain the intentionalness of these doings without committing ourselves to saying that agents do all sorts of things intentionally which they manifestly do not?



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Matthew Hanser
University of California at Santa Barbara

References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
Practical reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), Review of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 431--63.

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