J. L. Austin and Literal Meaning

European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):617-632 (2012)
Authors
Nat Hansen
University of Reading
Abstract
Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin's philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary's reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context-invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin's work, and I think Crary's reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin's targets, and the arguments that Crary attributes to Austin or finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary's reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00510.x
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References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Demonstratives.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Literal Meaning.François Recanati - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Minimal Semantics.Emma Borg - 2004 - Oxford University Press.

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How to Silence Content with Porn, Context and Loaded Questions.Alex Davies - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):498-522.

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