Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):399 - 415 (2011)
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This paper is about the nature of the relationship between (1) the doctrine of Non-Conceptualism about mental content, (2) Kant's Transcendental Idealism, and (3) the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or Categories, in the B (1787) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e., the B Deduction. Correspondingly, the main thesis of the paper is this: (1) and (2) yield serious problems for (3), yet, in exploring these two serious problems for the B Deduction, we also discover some deeply important and perhaps surprising philosophical facts about Kant's theory of cognition and his metaphysics.



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Robert Hanna
University of Colorado, Boulder

References found in this work

Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Kantian non-conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
Freedom, Teleology, and Rational Causation.Robert Hanna - 2009 - Kant Yearbook 1 (1):99-142.

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