Authors
Nat Hansen
University of Reading
Abstract
This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about ‘what we say’. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about ‘what we say’ should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. In this paper, I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language philosophers are engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success.
Keywords ordinary language philosophy  Stanley Cavell  meaning  metalinguistic negotiation  J.L. Austin  knowledge of language  implicature  speech acts
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DOI 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1310669
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. AUSTIN - 1962 - Oxford University Press.
Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 47.

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Citations of this work BETA

Metalinguistic Proposals.Nat Hansen - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (1-2):1-19.
No Picnic: Cavell on Rule-Descriptions.Constantine Sandis - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 44 (3):295-317.

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