Neurophenomenology and the spontaneity of consciousness

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 29:133-162 (2003)
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Abstract

Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed. Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain.

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reprint Hanna, Robert; Thompson, Evan (2003) "Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of Consciousness". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33(sup1):133-162

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Evan Thompson
University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Neurophenomenology.Antoine Lutz & Evan Thompson - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.
Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers.Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 40.

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