Res Publica 18 (4):283-301 (2012)

To enhance the plausibility of naturalistic moral realism, David Copp develops an argument from epistemic defeaters aiming to show that strongly a priori synthetic moral truths do not exist. In making a case for the non-naturalistic position, I locate Copp’s account within the wider literature on peer disagreement; I identify key points of divergence between Copp’s doctrine and conciliatorist doctrines; I introduce the notion of ‘minimal moral competence’; I contend that some plausible benchmarks for minimal moral competence are grounded in substantive moral considerations; and I discuss two forms of spinelessness that Copp’s moral naturalism could result in
Keywords Moral naturalism  Moral non-naturalism  Moral disagreement  David Copp  Naturalizing ethics  Minimal moral competence  Conciliatorism  Ethical anti-Archimedeanism
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DOI 10.1007/s11158-012-9196-0
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References found in this work BETA

Justice for Hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.

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Citations of this work BETA

From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary.Errol Lord - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-13.
From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary.Errol Lord - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):365-377.

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