Preference-based deontic logic (PDL)

Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (1):75 - 93 (1990)
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A new possible world semantics for deontic logic is proposed. Its intuitive basis is that prohibitive predicates (such as "wrong" and "prohibited") have the property of negativity, i.e. that what is worse than something wrong is itself wrong. The logic of prohibitive predicates is built on this property and on preference logic. Prescriptive predicates are defined in terms of prohibitive predicates, according to the wellknown formula "ought" = "wrong that not". In this preference-based deontic logic (PDL), those theorems that give rise to the paradoxes of standard deontic logic (SDL) are not obtained. (E.g., O(p & q) → Op & Oq and Op → O(p v q)) are theorems of SDL but not of PDL.) The more plausible theorems of SDL, however, can be derived in PDL



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Sven Ove Hansson
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

Citations of this work

Neighborhood Semantics for Modal Logic.Eric Pacuit - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Deontic logic.Paul McNamara - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Dynamic logic of preference upgrade.Johan van Benthem & Fenrong Liu - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):157-182.
Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.

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