Semifactual: Byrne's account of even-if

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):458-459 (2007)

Abstract
Byrne's approach to the semifactual conditional captures the reasoning data. However, we argue that it does not account for the processes or principles by which people arrive at representations of even-if conditionals, upon which their reasoning is said to be based. Drawing upon recent work on the suppositional conditional we present such an account.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X07002646
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Conditionals.Frank Jackson (ed.) - 1991 - Oxford University Press.

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