Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):423-448 (1997)
AbstractSituationist deontic logic is a model of that fraction of normative discourse which refers to only one situation and one set of alternatives. As we can see from a whole series of well-known paradoxes, standard deontic logic (SDL) is seriously mistaken even at the situationist level. In this paper it is shown how a more realistic deontic logic can be based on the assumption that prescriptive predicates satisfy the property of contranegativity. A satisfactory account of situation-specific norms is a necessary prerequisite for a successful treatment of more complex normative structures
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Citations of this work
The Meaning of 'Ought'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press. pp. 127-160.
Multiplex Semantics for Deontic Logic.Lou Goble - 2000 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (2):113-134.
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