Situationist deontic logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):423-448 (1997)
Abstract
Situationist deontic logic is a model of that fraction of normative discourse which refers to only one situation and one set of alternatives. As we can see from a whole series of well-known paradoxes, standard deontic logic (SDL) is seriously mistaken even at the situationist level. In this paper it is shown how a more realistic deontic logic can be based on the assumption that prescriptive predicates satisfy the property of contranegativity. A satisfactory account of situation-specific norms is a necessary prerequisite for a successful treatment of more complex normative structures
Keywords deontic logic  norms  situations  preference logic
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004233913104
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But What Should I Do?Sven Ove Hansson - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):433-440.

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