Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):423-448 (1997)

Authors
Sven Ove Hansson
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
Abstract
Situationist deontic logic is a model of that fraction of normative discourse which refers to only one situation and one set of alternatives. As we can see from a whole series of well-known paradoxes, standard deontic logic (SDL) is seriously mistaken even at the situationist level. In this paper it is shown how a more realistic deontic logic can be based on the assumption that prescriptive predicates satisfy the property of contranegativity. A satisfactory account of situation-specific norms is a necessary prerequisite for a successful treatment of more complex normative structures
Keywords deontic logic  norms  situations  preference logic
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004233913104
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References found in this work BETA

Ethical Consistency.B. A. O. Williams & W. F. Atkinson - 1965 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 39 (1):103-138.
Imperatives and Logic.Alf Ross - 1944 - Philosophy of Science 11 (1):30-46.
Permissions and Supererogation.Joseph Raz - 1975 - American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (2):161 - 168.
Law and Logic.Stig Kanger - 1972 - Theoria 38 (3):105-132.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Meaning of 'Ought'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press. pp. 127-160.
Multiplex Semantics for Deontic Logic.Lou Goble - 2000 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (2):113-134.
But What Should I Do?Sven Ove Hansson - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):433-440.

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