Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 39 (3):582-585 (1986)
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Abstract

This book brings together several strands of Salmon's important philosophical investigations, spanning two decades, into a comprehensive theory of scientific explanation. The fundamental tenet of Salmon's ontic conception of explanation is that "to explain an event is to exhibit it as occupying its... place in the discernible [causal] patterns of the world". Thus an adequate theory of explanation presupposes an account of the causal structure of the world, and one of the principal objectives of the book is to outline a theory of causal processes that will provide the requisite foundation for a theory of objective scientific explanation.

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