Mind 99 (393):91-99 (1990)
Some widely accepted arguments in the philosophy of mathematics are fallacious because they rest on results that are provable only by using assumptions that the con- clusions of these arguments seek to undercut. These results take the form of bicon- ditionals linking statements of logic with statements of mathematics. George Boolos has given an argument of this kind in support of the claim that certain facts about second-order logic support logicism, the view that mathematics—or at least part of it—reduces to logic. Hilary Putnam has offered a similar argument for the view that it is indifferent whether we take mathematics to be about objects or about what follows from certain postulates. In this paper I present and rebut these arguments
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Contemporary Interest of an Old Doctrine.William Demopoulos - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:209 - 216.
Pure Second-Order Logic with Second-Order Identity.Alexander Paseau - 2010 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (3):351-360.
Hilbert and the Emergence of Modern Mathematical Logic.Gregory H. Moore - 1997 - Theoria 12 (1):65-90.
Russell’s Reasons for Logicism.Ian Proops - 2006 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2):267-292.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #124,853 of 2,177,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #166,811 of 2,177,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?