Authors
Woojin Han
Duksung Women's University
Abstract
John Hawthorne (2002), David Braddon-Mitchell (2003), and Robert Stalnaker (2002), almost simultaneously but independently, developed a physicalistic argument which depends on such two conditional analyses: (1) If we experience dualistic pain, zombies are possible; (2) If our world is physicalistic, zombies are impossible. Hawthorne assumes that only an oracle will tell us which conditional is the case. From this setting, he concludes that zombies are conceivable butimpossible. I first show that Hawthorne actually fails in deriving neither the conceivability of zombies nor their impossibility. Next, I argue that Hawthorne’s reasoning entails an absurdity that any entity like God, whose existence is controversial, will be conceivable but impossible
Keywords Conference Proceedings  Contemporary Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI wcp22200842358
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,355
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Defence of the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts.Jussi Haukioja - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):145 - 151.
On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts.Torin Alter - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):777-778.
On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts.Torin Alter - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):235 - 253.
The Q Factor: Modal Rationalism Versus Modal Autonomism.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):365-380.
Review of Kirk's Zombies and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Yujin Nagasawa - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (2):170-171.
Phenomenal Concepts are Consistent with Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument.Francois-Igor Pris - 2014 - NB: Philosophical Investigations (Russian E-Journal) 7:64-98.
Phenomenal Ways of Thinking.Luca Malatesti - 2008 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):149-166.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-04-04

Total views
34 ( #337,367 of 2,519,610 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #406,756 of 2,519,610 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes