The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions

Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866 (2015)
Authors
Michael Hannon
University of London
Abstract
Knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘S knows that p’ are a central area of research in philosophy. But why do humans think and talk about knowledge? What are knowledge ascriptions for? This article surveys a variety of proposals about the role of knowledge ascriptions and attempts to provide a unified account of these seemingly distinct views.
Keywords knowledge ascriptions  knowledge norm  reliable informant
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DOI 10.1111/phc3.12290
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

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