The Later Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion

Philosophy Compass 5 (11):1013–22 (2010)

Abstract
This article sets out by distinguishing Wittgenstein’s own views in the philosophy of religion from a school of thought in the philosophy of religion that relies on later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. After a survey of distinguishing features of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the third section explores Wittgenstein’s treatment of Frazer’s account of magic among primitive peoples. The following section offers an account of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, including the use of the notions of a language game and superstition. I conclude by criticizing a very influential argument of Wittgenstein’s to the effect that the meaning of words like ‘belief’ and ‘object’ varies from context to context without having any one thing in common.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00339.x
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References found in this work BETA

Zettel.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1967 - Blackwell.
Culture and Value.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1977 - University of Chicago Press.
Quantifier Variance and Realism.Eli Hirsch - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):51-73.
Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951.James Klagge & Alfred Nordmann (eds.) - 1993 - Hackett Publishing Company.

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Wittgenstein and the Genteel Tradition.Reza Hosseini - 2019 - South African Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):287-296.

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